The Skeleton
Policy scaffold

Secure Configuration and Change Policy

Establishes what a system is supposed to look like, how that is enforced, and how it is allowed to change.

What it has to decide

  1. The authoritative baseline per platform, and its source

    Name the benchmark you build from and the version. "Hardened in line with best practice" is not auditable and does not survive a question.

  2. Documented deviations, with owners and expiry

    There will be deviations. Untracked ones are indistinguishable from misconfiguration, which is what makes drift undetectable.

  3. How compliance with the baseline is measured

    State the frequency and whether it is continuous or point in time. Configuration proven at build and never re-checked describes the past.

  4. Change authorisation, including the emergency path

    Emergency change will happen. Give it a defined route with retrospective approval, or it will happen with no route at all.

  5. Segregation between environments

    Who can deploy to production, and confirmation that production data does not flow backwards into test without treatment.

  6. Default credentials and unnecessary services

    Explicitly required to be removed before a system reaches production, and verified rather than asserted.

How it is usually got wrong

  • A baseline exists as a document, systems are built from an image that diverged from it years ago, and nothing compares the two.
  • Drift is measured annually, so a system can sit misconfigured for eleven months and pass.
  • Emergency change has no defined route, so urgent work bypasses change control entirely and is never recorded.
  • Production data is copied into test environments with weaker access controls and no masking.
  • Default credentials remain on appliances and embedded devices that nobody considers systems.

Worked extract

What a decision looks like once it has been madeEach platform is built from a documented baseline derived from the relevant CIS Benchmark, with the benchmark version recorded. Deviations from the baseline are recorded in the configuration exception register with a named owner, a stated reason and an expiry date not exceeding twelve months. Compliance with the baseline is measured continuously by automated assessment, and any system found non-compliant for more than seven days is escalated to the system owner. Changes to production are authorised through the change process; emergency changes may be made without prior authorisation where a Priority 1 incident requires it, and must be submitted for retrospective approval within two business days. Production data is not copied into non-production environments unless it has been masked or tokenised. Default credentials are removed and unnecessary services disabled before a system is released to production, and this is verified by automated check rather than attestation.